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Introduction 
“[C]riminal justice today,” Justice Anthony Kennedy declared, “is for 
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”1  Justice Kennedy’s 
statement captures the stark reality that 90 percent of all federal criminal 
cases are disposed of by the plea bargain.2  Despite the jury trial’s esteemed 
placement in the American cultural zeitgeist, the fact remains that in 2010 
only 2.8 percent of criminal defendants exercised their right to a jury trial.3  
Instead, the vast majority of defendants enter into “the supreme instance of 
waiver known to our system of justice:” the guilty plea.4 
Until recently, plea-bargaining was dismissed as a “necessary evil,” 
and delegated to private spheres shielded from the attention of the judicial 
and legislative branches.5  However, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions 
of Lafler v. Cooper6 and Missouri v. Frye7 demonstrate a profound shift in 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (arguing against the contention 
that a fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea 
bargaining). 
 2. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice 
Statistics, Criminal Defendants Disposed of in U.S. District Courts, tbl. 5.22.2010 (Kathleen 
Maguire ed.), available at http://albany.edu/ sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 935 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). 
 5. See Lafler at 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the United States, we have 
plea bargaining a-plenty, but until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil.”). 
 6. See id. at 1391 (majority opinion) (holding that counsel’s erroneous advice that led 
to defendant’s rejection of a plea bargain constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and 
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plea-bargaining law. In both cases the Court deemed defense counsel to 
have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining 
process.8  In Lafler v. Cooper, defense counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by giving erroneous advice that led his client to reject the 
favorable plea deal.9  Analogously, in Missouri v. Frye, defense counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to inform his client of a plea deal 
offer that eventually lapsed.10  The Court noted that an examination of these 
forfeited rights is necessary because plea-bargaining “is not some adjunct to 
the criminal justice system,” but rather “is our criminal justice system.”11 
The Court’s next step, following Cooper and Frye, should be to take a 
hard look at one of the most pervasive features of the plea-bargaining 
process: appellate waivers.12  When a criminal defendant enters a plea of 
guilty, he surrenders a plethora of rights, including his right to a jury trial, 
his right to face his accuser in a court of law, and his right against self-
incrimination.13  More recently and startlingly, criminal defendants are also 
forfeiting their statutory right to appeal, as an estimated two-thirds of 
federal plea bargains contain appellate waivers.14 
                                                                                                     
the error amounted to prejudice). 
 7. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410–11 (2012) (holding that counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not informing defendant of a favorable plea 
deal). 
 8. See Lafler 132 S. Ct. at 1376 (deeming defense counsel to have rendered 
ineffective assistance); see also Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1399 (affirming that the attorney’s 
representation was deficient).   
 9. See id. (“As to prejudice, respondent has shown that but for counsel’s deficient 
performance there is reasonable probability he and the trial court would have accepted the 
guilty plea.”). 
 10. See Frye 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (stating that defendant’s attorney was deficient 
because attorney did not inform his client of a favorable plea deal before the plea deal 
expired). 
 11. See id. at 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Symposium: 
Punishment, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
 12. See Editorial Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 
2012, at A24 [hereinafter Review Me] (noting that waivers are “a common but largely hidden 
element of plea bargains”). 
 13. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING 89 (3d ed. 2012) (stating that a plea 
agreement may result in the defendant’s forfeiture of some constitutional rights such as 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to trial by jury). 
 14. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (Nov. 2005) (“In nearly two-thirds of the cases settled 
by plea agreement in our sample, the defendant waived his right to review.”). 
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Appellate waivers create unique problems between attorney and client 
in a post-waiver situation.15  Critically, waivers may vitiate an attorney’s 
obligation to file a client’s requested appeal.16  Therefore, these waivers 
may cause defendants to lose two rights: their statutory appeal rights as well 
as their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.17 
This Note advances that defense counsel renders ineffective assistance 
by refusing to file an appeal because of the presence of a waiver.  Parts I 
and II of this Note will examine the appellate waiver and the circuit split 
regarding ineffective assistance in a post-waiver situation.  Part III will 
argue that § 2255 ineffective assistance waivers are invalid and therefore 
should not bar courts from addressing whether an attorney renders 
ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal.  And finally, Part 
IV will argue that counsel’s role as advocate of his client and officer of the 
court creates the obligation to file a notice of appeal even in a post-waiver 
context. 
I.  The Appellate Waiver 
A.  The Right to Appeal 
A plea deal begins with an offer by the prosecutor to defense counsel 
regarding the disposition of the defendant’s case.18  In order to incentivize 
the defendant to plead guilty, the prosecutor makes concessions, like a 
reduced sentence recommendation or a dismissal of one of the charges.19  
                                                                                                     
 15. See generally infra Part III.B (discussing the ethical dilemma of a defense attorney 
allowing a client to sign waiver absolving attorney of any liability). 
 16. See generally United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008); Nunez v. 
United States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 18. See generally HERMAN, supra note 13 (discussing the negotiation process between 
prosecutors and defense counsel). 
 19. See id. at 1–2. 
Generally, plea negotiations result in one or more of the following: (1) 
the prosecutor agrees not to charge the defendant; (2) the defendant 
pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a reduced charge or lesser included 
charge; (3) the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a particular 
charge in exchange for the dismissal of other charges; (4) the defendant 
pleads guilty or nolo contendere as charged or to a lesser charge in 
return for a sentencing concession by the prosecutor; or (5) the 
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The defendant will be further incentivized to plead guilty because 
defendants who exercise their right to a jury trial typically receive 
excessively greater sentences due to the so-called “jury trial penalty.”20 
The plea agreement stipulates facts regarding the defendant’s guilt,21 
and critically contains a sentencing recommendation.22  In federal criminal 
law, a defendant may enter either a Type C plea bargain, which includes a 
binding sentencing recommendation, or a Type B plea bargain, which 
includes a non-binding sentencing recommendation.23  The majority of plea 
agreements are Type B bargains, although commentators have called for a 
greater use of Type C bargains.24  As a consequence, the vast majority of 
criminal defendants do not know the sentence they will receive and cannot 
withdraw their plea after receiving an unanticipated sentence. 
A defendant pleads guilty at a plea hearing according to the procedural 
and substantive guidelines of Rule 11 of Criminal Procedure.25  Before 
accepting the guilty plea, a judge will conduct a plea colloquy meant to 
ensure the defendant understands the rights that he is waiving.26  The judge 
may choose to accept the plea deal upon determining that the defendant is 
knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty.27 
                                                                                                     
defendant enters a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, 
reserving the right to appeal the judgment and withdraw his plea in the 
event that the appellate court affords him relief on the adverse 
determination of a specified pretrial motion. 
 20. See DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
289 (4th ed. 2010). 
 21. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 227 (describing how these stipulations of facts are 
generally binding on the parties). 
 22. See id. at 221–29. 
 23. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)(C). 
 24. See Shayna M. Sigman, Comment An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options, 
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317 (1999) (examining the pros and cons of different plea agreements, 
especially between Type B and Type C sentence bargain agreements). 
 25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); see also HERMAN, supra note 13, at 213–14. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See HERMAN, supra note 13, at 213–14 (3d ed. 2012). 
In federal court, when a defendant enters a plea of guilty – whether as a 
“straight” guilty plea, plea of nolo contendere, Alford plea, conditional 
plea, or any of the foregoing pursuant to a plea agreement – Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11 sets forth procedural and substantive requirements to be 
followed by the judge to ensure that the plea is knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for the plea.  Rule 
11 is addressed to three core concerns: the plea must be free from 
coercion; the defendant must understand the nature of the charges 
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A defendant’s sentencing hearing takes place at a later date, often 
several months later.  Although the plea agreement usually contains a 
sentencing recommendation, the judge may ignore this recommendation 
and exercise his discretion in sentencing the defendant.28  Further, per 
United States v. Booker,29 the judge is not bound by the Sentencing 
Guidelines.30 
Many appealable issues arise during the plea process.31  The United 
States Sentencing Commission categorizes appeal rates under nine broad 
categories: Reasonableness Issues, 18 U.S.C § 3553 Factors Issues, Drug 
Trafficking Issues, Other Non-Guideline Issues, Departure Guidelines 
Issues, Criminal History Guidelines Issues, Fraud and Deceit Issues, 
Immigration and Naturalization Offenses Issues, and Role in the Offense 
Guidelines Issues.32  General substantive reasonableness factors constituted 
the most appealed issue.33  The second most popular issue was appealing a 
procedural error for the court failing to address or improperly considered 
§ 3353 factor.34 
Criminal defendants may challenge their conviction or sentence 
through two statutory avenues of appeal.35  The first avenue is a direct 
appeal under 18 U.S.C § 3742, which permits a defendant to challenge the 
validity of his conviction.  Section 18 USC § 3742 grants that: 
A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district court for review of 
an otherwise final sentence if the sentence – (1) was imposed in 
violation of the law; (2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 
application of the sentencing guidelines; or (3) is greater than the 
                                                                                                     
against him; and the defendant must understand the consequences of his 
plea. 
 28. See United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1146 (4th Cir. 1977) (“In our opinion 
each individual judge is free to decide whether, and to what degree, he will entertain plea 
bargains, and his refusal to consider any plea bargaining whatsoever will not vitiate a guilty 
plea which has otherwise been knowingly and voluntarily entered.”). 
 29. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2005) (holding that the 
Sentencing Guidelines are discretionary and not mandatory). 
 30. Id. at 225. 
 31. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Sentencing Issues Appealed for 
Selected Guidelines, Table 59 (Fiscal Year 2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/Table59.pdf. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). 
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sentence specified in the applicable guideline range to the extent that the 
sentence includes a greater fine or term of imprisonment, probation, or 
supervised release than the maximum established by the guideline range, 
or includes a more limiting condition of probation or supervised release 
under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(11) than the maximum established in the 
guideline range; or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no 
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.36 
Many of the most important recent Supreme Court criminal procedure 
decisions are the result of direct appeals.37  Alternatively, the defendant 
may file a collateral appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).38  The cases of 
Cooper and Frye are both examples of defendants collaterally attacking 
their sentence pursuant to a § 2255 motion.39  The right to collaterally 
appeal a sentence is such that: 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of 
Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the 
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 
sentence or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 
by law, or is subject to collateral attack, may move the court which 
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.40 
B.  The Use of Appellate Waivers 
An appellate waiver is a provision in the plea agreement whereby the 
defendant waives these rights to appeal.41  One study estimated nearly two-
thirds of plea bargains contain an appellate waiver provision.42  Appellate 
waivers grew in popularity after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,43 
                                                                                                     
 36. Id. 
 37. See United States v. Vanderwerff, 2012 WL 2514933 at 5 (D. Colo. 2012) 
(“Indeed, appellate waivers would have insulated from review the underlying convictions in 
some of the most notable criminal decisions in the Supreme Court's recent history.”). See 
also Nancy J. King and Michael E. O'Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 55 Duke L.J. 209, 249 (2005) (noting that waivers would have precluded appellate 
review in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004); and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012). 
 39. See Lefler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399 (2012).  
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).  
 41. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 219. 
 42. Id. at 211. 
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. (2012).  
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which “provided hundreds of new sentencing issues for defendants to raise 
on appeal, even after pleading guilty.”44  Facing a wave of appeals, 
prosecutors began including appellate waivers in plea-bargain agreements.45  
Appellate waivers caught on in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits and 
quickly spread to the other circuits.46  Prosecutors “loved them” and judges 
“encouraged them.”47  Today, the appeal waiver is one of the main features 
of the plea-bargaining system.48  In fact, the official policy of the 
Department of Justice is to “require every defendant who signs a plea 
agreement to waive the right to appeal any sentencing error committed by 
the sentencing judge.”49 
Appeal waivers vary widely in scope. The most common appeal 
waiver is the direct appeal waiver, which bars a defendant from appealing 
the validity of the sentence he receives.50  Typically, a direct appeal waiver 
will instruct that the defendant waives his right to appeal his sentence so 
long as his sentence does not extend higher than the upward range.51 The 
following is a textual example of a typical direct appeal waiver: 
Defendant . . . is also aware that his sentence has not yet been 
determined by the Court. Defendant is aware that any estimate of 
probable sentencing range that he may have received from his counsel, 
the United States, or the probation office is a prediction, not a promise, 
and is not binding on the United States, the probation office, or the 
Court. Realizing the uncertainty in estimating what sentence he will 
ultimately receive, Defendant knowingly waives his right to appeal the 
sentence in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in 
this agreement.52 
In addition to a direct appeal waiver, the defendant may agree to a 
broader waiver: the collateral attack waiver.  A collateral attack waiver 
                                                                                                     
 44. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 219–220. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 221. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Jack W. Campbell IV & Gregory A. Castanias, Feature: Sentencing—Appeal 
Waivers: Recent Decisions Open the Door to Reinvigorated Challenges, 24 CHAMPION 34 
(2000). 
 49. See id. (citing United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 44–45 (D.D.C. 1997)). 
 50. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 234 (3rd Cir. 2008). 
 51. See United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant 
could not be said to have waived his right to appellate review of a sentence imposed in 
excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute . . . .”).  
 52. See id. at 494 n.1. 
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prevents the defendant from raising challenges regarding circumstances 
distinct from the legality of the conviction and sentence, such as ineffective 
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial abuse.53  An example of a collateral 
attack waiver is waiving any right “to challenge any conviction or sentence 
or the manner in which the sentence was determined in any collateral 
proceeding, including but not limited to a motion brought under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 2255.”54  Collateral attack waivers are 
estimated to accompany three-quarters of direct appeal waivers.55  Further, 
of these plea agreements containing collateral attack waivers, one–third do 
not retain the right to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.56  
Consequently, appeal waivers have been demonstrated to bar constitutional 
claims including ineffective assistance of counsel claims.57 
C.  The Costs and Benefits of Appellate Waivers 
Ten circuit courts have expressly upheld the use of appeal waivers.58  
Reasoning that because a defendant may waive his constitutional rights, 
courts declare that a defendant may also waive a statutory right to appeal.59  
Circuit courts like the appellate waiver because it has reduced the number 
of appeals, thereby easing the burden of a crowded appeals docket. 60  In a 
comprehensive study on appellate waivers, Nancy King found that 
prosecutors believe that appellate waivers have reduced their appellate 
                                                                                                     
 53. See Mabry, 536 F.3d at 234 (discussing the waiver of the right to collaterally 
attack the sentence and its consequences).  
 54. Id. at 233. 
 55. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 213. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52–54 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1990);  United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827 (8th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Melancon, 
972 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993);  
United States v. Hernandez, 134 F.3d 1435 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Fleming, 239 
F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 59. See United States v. Andis, 552 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2002); but see United States v. 
Perez, 46 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 (D. Mass 1999) (pointing out that this syllogism “too quickly 
assumes that there is no constitutional dimension to the right to appeal . . . . ‘Once a system 
of appellate courts is put into place . . . a defendant’s ability to appeal may not be unduly 
burdened.’”) (citing United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 555 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
 60. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 230. 
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burden.61  Further, defendants sometimes view the waiver favorably 
because the waiver might give them the benefit of a reduced sentence.62   
Despite the benefits, the Supreme Court has not yet approved of 
appellate waivers.63  Further, recent district court decisions rejecting plea-
bargain agreements containing waivers suggest “an opportunity for renewed 
challenges to sentencing-appeal waivers.”64  Appeal waivers garner much 
criticism.65  Opponents point to the unequal bargaining position between the 
United States government and the typical criminal defendant.66  Criminal 
defendants not only lack the vast informational advantage of the 
government, but most criminal defendants belong to society’s most 
vulnerable classes.67  In fact, over 52 percent of federal criminal defendants 
in 2011 did not receive their high school diploma and 45 percent were non-
US citizens.68  Thus, appeal waiver opponents suggest that our system of 
pleas then “looks more like a system of railroading.”69  In addition to 
general fairness concerns, appeal waivers pose unique challenges for 
attorneys and their obligation to clients in post-waiver cases. 
 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id. 
 62. See United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1992) (“We also note that 
plea agreements are of value to the accused in order to gain concessions from the 
government.”), overruled by United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2003); see also 
United States v. Elliot, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2011) (“A waiver of appellate rights 
can be of great value to an accused as a means of gaining concessions by the government.”). 
 63. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and the Waiver of 
the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C.L. REV. 871, 878 (2010).  But see also Reimelt at n.73:  
Commentators suggest that although the Supreme Court has not ruled on 
the issue specifically, its approval of prosecutorial solicitation of waivers 
of the protections of Rule 11(e)(6) of the FRCP and Rule 410 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence suggest that the Court would approve the 
practice of conditioning pleas on appellate waivers if the issue came 
before it. 
 64. See Campbell & Castanias, supra note 48, at 34. 
 65. See King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 211. 
 66. See Review Me, supra note 12 (describing the plea bargaining process as 
“coercion”). 
 67. See infra, note 68. 
 68. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION 2011, Sourcebook of Federal 
Sentencing Statistics, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_ 
Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2011/sbtoc11.htm. 
 69. See Review Me, supra note 12. 
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II.  Circuit Split Regarding Appellate Waivers 
A.  Must Defense Counsel File a Notice of Appeal in a Post-Waiver 
Situation? 
Appeal waivers have caused a significant split among the federal 
circuit courts, with criminal defendants’ Sixth Amendment right caught up 
in the fray.70  The issue posed is this: If a criminal defendant signs a waiver 
but nevertheless asks his attorney to file an appeal, must the attorney do so?  
If the attorney fails to do so, has the attorney rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel? 
The Sixth Amendment ensures the right to effective assistance of 
counsel and the Supreme Court consistently maintains that the right to 
assistance of counsel means the right to effective assistance of counsel. 71  In 
order to constitute ineffective assistance, the attorney’s conduct must be 
objectively unreasonable, and the attorney’s conduct must have caused 
cognizable harm to the plaintiff.72  Furthermore, it is established that a 
lawyer who disregards a defendant’s specific instruction to file a notice of 
appeal acts in a professionally unreasonable manner.73  However, post-
waiver situations have called this well-settled doctrine into question. 
B.  Flores-Ortega Presumption: Defense Counsel Must File a Notice of 
Appeal in a Post-Waiver Situation 
Eight circuits maintain that an attorney renders ineffective assistance 
by not filing a requested appeal in a post-waiver situation.74  The Court of 
                                                                                                     
 70. See generally infra Part II.B–II.C. 
 71. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (holding that a competently 
counseled defendant who alleges that he pleaded guilty because of a prior coerced 
confession is not, without more, entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus). 
 72. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (setting forth the framework 
for judging an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 73. See Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (holding a rule invalid since 
it makes an indigent defendant (who must prepare his petition under § 2255 without 
assistance of counsel) face “the danger of conviction because he does not know how to 
establish his innocence”). 
 74. See United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195-99 (9th Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 
F.3d 788, 791-94 (11th Cir. 2005); Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 
2006); United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tapp, 491 
F.3d 236 (5th Cir. 2007); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2007);  Campbell 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the issue in Campusano v. United 
States.75  Jose Campusano was charged with one count of distributing and 
possessing with intent to distribute 27 grams of cocaine.76  On November 7, 
2001, Campusano entered a plea of guilty.77  At the plea hearing, the 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Have you discussed with your attorney how the 
sentencing guidelines might apply to your case? 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not to [sic] certain about that, but - - 
THE COURT: Have you discussed the sentencing guidelines with your 
attorney? 
THE DEFENDANT: I've spoken about that but I didn't understand it 
that clearly.78 
Due to Campusano’s demonstrated lack of understanding, the lower 
court adjourned to encourage Campusano’s attorney to discuss the 
Sentencing Guidelines with his client.79  The lower court reconvened later 
that day and Campusano entered his plea.80  As part of the plea agreement, 
Campusano waived his right to directly appeal or collaterally attack the 
sentence he would later receive.81 
                                                                                                     
v. United States, 686 F.3d 353 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 75. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that 
the per se rule that an attorney who fails to file a requested appeal constitutes prejudice 
applies in a post-waiver situation). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Campusano v. United States, 
442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245. 
 78. Id. at 4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 4–6. 
 81. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006). The court 
stated: 
The relevant language reads as follows: ‘It is further agreed (i) that the 
defendant will neither appeal, nor otherwise litigate under Title 28, 
United States Code, Section 3355, any sentence within or below the 
stipulated Guidelines range set forth above (108 to 135 months) . . . . 
Furthermore, it is agreed that any appeal as to the defendant’s sentence 
that is not foreclosed by this provision will be limited to that portion of 
the sentencing calculation that is inconsistent with (or not addressed by) 
the above stipulation. 
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Campusano’s sentencing hearing occurred months later on March 26, 
2002 and lasted several days.82  At the hearing, the lower court wrestled 
with the issue of whether or not to apply a firearm enhancement to 
Campusano’s sentence.83  If a firearm enhancement applied, then 
Campusano would receive a greater sentence.84  A firearm enhancement 
would also render Campusano ineligible for the safety valve exemption, 
which would allow him to receive a downward departure of his sentence.85  
The relevant rule stated: “[A]djustment should be applied if the weapon 
was present unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected 
with the offense.”86  The police did seize a gun from Campusano when he 
was arrested.87  However, Campusano was not arrested until several months 
after the commission of the offense.88  Further, police only seized the 
firearm in a search of Campusano’s home incident to his arrest.89  Thus, the 
firearm was not present at the time of the crime and firearm enhancement 
was not applicable.90 
However, Campusano’s attorney failed to emphasize this critical 
point.91  Campusano’s attorney skipped over the presence prong, instead 
arguing the weapon was improbably related with the offense.92  
Campusano’s attorney emphasized witness testimony that Campusano only 
possessed the firearm because he took the gun from a neighbor who had 
threatened to use the weapon to kill his wife.93  However, the “improbably 
related” test was a more difficult hurdle to overcome than the objective 
“presence” requirement.  The lower court rejected Campusano’s arguments, 
                                                                                                     
 82. See Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Campusano v. United 
States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245 (stating that 
sentencing proceedings occurred on March 26, April 18, and May 21, 2002). 
 83. See id. at 7 (quoting the lower court as stating that it was “deeply troubled” by the 
question of whether to apply the enhancement). 
 84. See id. at 11. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 6. 
 87. Id. at 1–2.  
 88. Id. at 1.  
 89. Id. at 1–2. 
 90. Id. at 8–9.  
 91. See id. at 6–7 (stating that Campusano’s attorney “inexplicably failed to argue” 
that the gun was recovered months after the date of the charged crime). 
 92. See id. (arguing the weapon was improbably related with the offense). 
 93. Id. at 7. 
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finding that Campusano’s firearm could be related to his drug activity.94  
Campusano received a two-point firearm enhancement, and was 
subsequently denied safety valve eligibility.95  Campusano twice asked his 
attorney to appeal the decision, but his attorney failed to do so.96 
Consequently, Campusano filed a § 2255 collateral attack, alleging,  
(1) [C]ounsel’s failure to advance a reasonable argument for the 
Petitioner’s ineligibility for exposure to a two-level firearm 
enhancement and counsel’s related failure to advise the Petitioner 
concerning this enhancement; (2) counsel’s failure to advise the 
Petitioner that the application of the two-level firearm enhancement 
rendered him ineligible for a two-level “safety valve” reduction; (3) 
counsel’s failure to present a reasonable argument for a downward 
departure; and, (4) counsel’s failure, in light of the district court’s denial 
of the safety-valve reduction and its application of the firearm 
enhancement, to follow the Petitioner’s instructions to file a notice of 
appeal on his behalf.97 
After the district court dismissed Campusano’s ineffective assistance 
of counsel motion brought pursuant to § 2255, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reviewed the case.98  The Second Circuit, in an opinion 
written by then-circuit judge Sonia Sotomayor, held that Campusano’s 
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file the 
requested appeal.99  In so deciding, the court relied on the case of Roe v. 
Flores-Ortega.100  The Supreme Court decided in Flores-Ortega that: (1) A 
lawyer who disregards a defendant’s specific instructions to file a notice of 
appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable; (2) Where 
counsel’s error leads to forfeiture of appeal prejudice is presumed; (3) 
When counsel fails to file a requested appeal, a defendant is entitled to a 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 10. 
 95. Id. at 11. 
 96. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772 (2d Cir. 2006) 
 97. Brief and Appendix for the Petitioner-Appellant at 11, Campusano v. United 
States, 442 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 04-5134-pr), 2005 WL 5012245. 
 98. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 775. 
 99. See id. (“[W]e now hold . . . that where counsel does not file a requested notice of 
appeal and fails to file an adequate Anders brief, courts may not dismiss the hypothetical 
appeal as frivolous on collateral review.”). 
 100. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000) (finding that counsel’s failure 
to timely file notice of appeal deprived defendant of appellate proceedings altogether, and 
was presumptively prejudicial). 
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new appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have merit.101  
Although Flores-Ortega did not specifically address a post-waiver case, the 
Second Circuit took “very seriously the need to make sure that defendants 
are not unfairly deprived of the opportunity to appeal.”102  Explaining that 
“constitutional protections are endangered” if counsel fails to pursue an 
appeal, the court held that “where counsel does not file a requested notice 
of appeal and fails to file an adequate Anders103 brief, courts may not 
dismiss the hypothetical appeal as frivolous on collateral review.”104  Seven 
other circuits also employ the Second Circuit’s reasoning, maintaining that 
Flores-Ortega is a per se rule and the presence of an appeal waiver does not 
vitiate counsel’s appeal obligations.105 
C.  Third and Seventh Circuit Conclude § 2255 Waiver Bars Appeal 
The Third and Seventh Circuit hold a divergent view from the majority 
of courts.  In 2008, the Third Circuit first addressed the issue in the case of 
United States v. Mabry.106  James Mabry was charged with possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine and crack, possession of a firearm during a drug 
trafficking crime, and felon in possession of firearm.107  Mabry pleaded 
guilty to the charge of possession with intent to distribute in exchange for 
the government dismissing the remaining charges.108  In his guilty plea, 
Mabry agreed to a very broad appeal waiver, barring both a direct appeal 
                                                                                                     
 101. Id. at 470, 471. 
 102. Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 775 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 103. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that appointed counsel 
must, upon determining a case to be wholly frivolous and requesting permission to 
withdraw, file a brief referencing anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal). 
 104. Campusano, 442 F.3d at 775. 
 105. See United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 273 (4th Cir. 2007); United States 
v. Tapp, 491 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2007); Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358 
(6th Cir. 2012); Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Sandoval-Lopez, 409 F.3d 1193, 1195-99 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Garrett, 402 F.3d 
1262, 1266-67 (10th Cir. 2005); Gomez-Diaz v. United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791-94 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
 106. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 2008) (enforcing 
defendant’s collateral attack waiver and refusing to consider whether defendant’s attorney 
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 107. Id. at 233. 
 108. Id.  
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and a collateral attack.109  However, Mabry raised serious objections to 
issues at his sentencing hearing, and he asked his attorney to file a § 3742 
direct appeal to challenge the correctness of the calculation of his sentence 
under the Sentencing Guidelines.110  Despite the express instruction to do 
so, Mabry’s attorney did not perform the “ministerial task”111 of filing the 
notice of appeal.112  Mabry was therefore barred from directly appealing his 
sentence.113  Consequently, Mabry filed a § 2255 pro se collateral attack, 
arguing his attorney’s failure to file the § 3742 appeal constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel.114 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Mabry’s § 2255 
petition.115  Rather than focusing on the Flores-Ortega presumption like the 
Campusano court, the Mabry court instead hinged the decision on Mabry’s 
§ 2255 appeal waiver.116  The court determined that because Mabry had 
signed a § 2255 appeal waiver, and the waiver was valid, Mabry’s § 2255 
appeal must necessarily be dismissed.117  The Mabry court criticized the 
other circuits for their “flawed reasoning” in relying on Flores-Ortega 
rather than examining the § 2255 waiver itself: “[The Campusano court] 
did not evaluate the validity of the habeas waiver, but instead skipped 
immediately to the merits of the argument raised in the § 2255 motion, 
namely whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a direct 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 238. 
 110. Id. at 235 (“Namely, (1) a two-point enhancement for possession of a firearm 
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(1) should not 
have been applied; (2) a one-point deduction for acceptance of responsibility should have 
been applied; (3) defendant was improperly designated an armed career criminal under 
U.S.S.G. §4B1.1; and (4) the criminal history category used by the District Court 
substantially overrepresented the defendant’s criminal history.”). 
 111. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (“[F]iling a notice of appeal is 
a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to the defendant’s 
wishes.”). 
 112. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In the motion, he 
complained of counsel’s failure to file an appeal notwithstanding his request that counsel do 
so). 
 113. Id. at 235. 
 114. Id. at 234. 
 115. Id. at 244. 
 116. See id. at 241 (“In any event, we believe that the other courts of appeals that have 
considered this issue have applied Flores-Ortega to a situation in which it simply does not 
‘fit.’” ). 
 117. See id. at 244 (finding that Mabry’s waiver was “knowing and voluntary” and that 
enforcement would not work a miscarriage of justice). 
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appeal.”118  Thus, the Mabry court dismissed the petitioner’s claim on 
procedural grounds, and refused to consider the substantive Sixth 
Amendment issue.  In so deciding, The Third Circuit joined the Seventh 
Circuit in finding that a failure to file an appeal does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.119  Because 70% of appeal waivers do not 
exempt ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Third and Seventh 
Circuit’s mode of analysis poses severe threats to a defendant’s appeal 
rights.120 
D.  Suggested Resolution of the Circuit Split 
The circuit split should be resolved in favor of finding that an attorney 
renders ineffective assistance for failure to file a requested appeal.  Two 
points compel this conclusion.  First, the right to effective assistance of 
counsel should not be waivable, thereby rendering the Third and Seventh 
Circuits’ analysis erroneous.  Second, an attorney has the obligation to file 
the appeal not only because of the Flores-Ortega presumption as described 
by the Campusano court, but also because of the attorney’s twin roles as 
advocate and officer of the court.  Therefore, a criminal defendant may not 
waive the enshrined right to effective assistance of counsel and this right 
encompasses filing a requested appeal in a post-waiver case. 
III.  The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel is Not Waivable 
A.  Section 2255 Ineffective Assistance Waivers 
The right to assistance of counsel is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment 
of the Constitution, which mandates that “the accused shall enjoy the right 
to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”121  The right is 
fundamental to American conceptions of justice, and Supreme Court 
decisions continually reinforce the significance of the right.122  Despite the 
                                                                                                     
 118. Id. at 240. 
 119. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2008) (denying collateral 
relief based on defendant’s collateral attack waiver). 
 120. King & O’Neill, supra note 14, at 246. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 122. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399 (2012). 
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right’s esteemed placement in our spectrum of liberties, the protection has 
been rendered vulnerable by the widespread use of collateral attack 
waivers.  Approximately one-third of all criminal defendants who enter into 
plea-bargain agreements waive their right to effective assistance of 
counsel.123 
B.  Ineffective Assistance Waivers Present Ethical Problems for Defense 
Counsel 
Supreme Court precedent mandates that a criminal defendant is 
entitled to effective assistance of counsel, and this right ensures conflict-
free representation.124  In addition to case law, the American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct describe professional 
guidelines for attorneys, and the Supreme Court has legitimized these 
codified standards as “important guides” for determining standards for 
counsel’s performance.125  The Model Rules illuminate the conflict of 
interest dilemma that ineffective assistance waivers present to defense 
counsel.126   
Ineffective assistance waivers violate Model Rule 1.7, which holds 
that a lawyer must not represent a client if the representation involves a 
conflict of interest.127  A conflict of interest exists if there is a significant 
risk that the representation of a client will be materially limited by a 
personal interest of the lawyer.”128  By advising a client to waive the right 
to bring an ineffective assistance claim, the attorney is limiting his own 
personal liability and safeguarding his own personal interests.  The best 
interest of the client is lost as a result.  The Missouri Ethics Body found that 
ineffective assistance waivers were unethical, concluding that defense 
counsel cannot “provide competent and diligent representation to the 
                                                                                                     
 123. King & O’Neill, supra note 14, 213 (“Three-quarters of the defendants in our 
sample who waived appeal also waived collateral review; of these, fewer than one-third 
preserved the right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
 124. See Alabama v. Washington, 53 U.S. 654 (2002); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“[T]he Court has recognized that ‘the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))). 
 125. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
 126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
 127. Id. at R. 1.7 (1983). 
 128. Id. at  R. 1.7(a)(2) (1983). 
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defendant regarding the effectiveness of defense counsel’s representation of 
the defendant.”129 
Ineffective assistance waivers also violate Model Rule 1.8, which 
mandates that an attorney shall not make an agreement limiting the 
lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice.130  A waiver of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is an express agreement that limits the attorney’s 
liability, because it forecloses the possibility of the defendant raising any 
objections to his attorney’s performance.  Thus, an attorney who helps 
structure a plea deal containing a waiver, and then advises his client to 
agree to such a waiver, creates an unacceptable conflict of interest.  Critics 
have compared the conflict of interest as “akin to a doctor handing a patient 
a liability waiver just as the patient is being wheeled into surgery or, more 
aptly, like advising a client regarding an agreement that would limit the 
lawyer’s prospective malpractice liability.”131 
An ex-ante remedy to this ethical dilemma is for defense attorneys to 
prevent their clients from waiving this right.132  State advisory opinions 
have in fact stated that attorneys are obligated to not allow their client to 
sign these provisions.133  The ex-post remedy is for courts to refuse to 
enforce ineffective assistance waivers.  Most state ethics bodies that have 
considered the issue have decided that collateral waivers are unenforceable 
on ethical grounds.134  Federal courts need to follow the example of state 
courts and determine that an attorney may not ethically advise his client to 
agree to a plea agreement containing such a waiver.  Federal courts should 
also refuse to enforce a provision that so flagrantly violates the ethical 
boundaries of the attorney-client relationship. 
                                                                                                     
 129. Advisory Comm. of the Supreme Court of Mo., Formal Op. 126 (May 19, 2009). 
 130. MODEL RULES, supra note 162, at R. 1.8(h)(1) (1983). 
 131. Allan Ellis & Todd Bussert, Stemming the Tide of Postconviction Waivers, 25 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2010) (discussing appeal waivers and the ethical constraints placed on 
defense attorneys and prosecutors in using these waivers). 
 132. See id. (“[D]efense counsel should be assertive in seeking revisions to plea 
agreements that preserve a client’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. . . .”). 
 133. See Ellis & Bussert, supra note 131 (“Importantly, the ethics bodies in five of six 
jurisdictions, which have considered the question, have issued opinions excluding ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims from the scope of permissible post-conviction waivers”). 
 134. See id.  
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C.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Waivers Violate Defendant’s Due 
Process Rights 
An ineffective assistance of counsel waiver is not only unethical but 
also hardly lawful.  Criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal 
proceeding.135  Supreme Court precedent establishes that this right to 
counsel extends to the sentencing phase.136  The government violates a 
criminal defendant’s due process right by asking the defendant to waive the 
fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel. 
1.  The Supposed Validity of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Waivers 
The circuit courts typically uphold ineffective assistance waivers if the 
claim does not relate to the decisions leading up the entrance of the plea.  
The courts first addressed the validity of ineffective assistance of counsel 
waivers by looking at whether § 2255 waivers were generally valid.137  The 
Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Wilkes,138 began the analysis by noting that 
courts had already enforced the validity of knowing and voluntary direct 
appeal waivers.139  A collateral waiver could also be entered knowingly and 
voluntarily.140  Finding no logical reason for distinguishing between direct 
appeal waivers and collateral waivers, the Fifth Circuit decided that 
collateral waivers were valid as well.141  Other circuits similarly enforce 
collateral attack waivers.142  Despite this general determination, the Fifth 
                                                                                                     
 135. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (“The Sixth Amendment requires 
effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of the criminal proceeding.”). 
 136. See Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203–04 (2001); see also Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967) (indicating the significant influence defense counsel plays 
during a sentencing hearing). 
 137. See United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (dismissing 
defendant’s § 2255 appeal because defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
appeal). 
 138. See id. at 652 (denying defendant’s motion to vacate his sentence because he 
waived his right to post-conviction relief as part of a plea deal). 
 139. See id. at 653 (“[U]nder the United States v. Melancon . . . , a defendant can waive 
his right to appeal as part of a plea agreement if the waiver is informed and voluntary.”). 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. ([W]e see no principled means of distinguishing such a waiver from the 
waiver of a right to appeal.”). 
 142. See Mason v. United States, 211 F.3d 1065, 1069 (7th Cir. 2000); Watson v. 
United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488–89 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 
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Circuit was weary of applying the presumptive validity to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.143  The Ninth Circuit also expressed doubt that 
a § 2255 waiver could bar an ineffective assistance claim.144  The Fifth and 
Ninth Circuit’s reluctance to extend the validity of the § 2255 waiver to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims evinces a respect for the importance 
of the constitutional protection. 
Nevertheless, years later the Fifth Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit by 
expressly holding that a § 2255 waiver could bar ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.145  The Seventh Circuit framed the issue by asking whether 
a plea agreement that “waives the right to file a petition under § 2555 bars a 
defendant from arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when negotiating the agreement or that the agreement was involuntary.”146  
The court concluded that justice necessitates that “the right to mount a 
collateral attack pursuant to a § 2255 survives [a waiver] only with respect 
to those discrete claims which relate directly to the negotiation of the 
waiver.”147  Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a defendant could not 
waive his right to effective assistance of counsel regarding assistance 
leading up to the plea.  The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Cockerham,148 
adopted the Seventh Circuit’s analysis.149  The Tenth Circuit concluded that 
the issue is whether the “ineffective assistance tainted the voluntariness of 
the plea” or “the waiver agreement itself.”150  Post-plea issues, including 
counsel errors at sentencing, did not go to the “voluntariness of the plea” or 
“the waiver agreement itself.”151  Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded 
                                                                                                     
433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cockerham 237 F.3d. 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Latorre v. United States, 193 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 143. See United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Such a waiver may 
not always apply to a collateral attack based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
 144. See United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e do not 
hold that [defendant’s] waiver categorically forecloses him from bring any section 2255 
proceeding, such as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 
 145. See United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that 
there are some ineffective assistance of counsel claims that should not be immune from 
waiver). 
 146. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144–45 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 147. Id. at 1145. 
 148. See United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (quoting United States v. Vasquez, 194 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 1999)). 
 151. Id. at 1184. 
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that a defendant could validly waive his right to effective assistance of 
counsel.152 
2.  Ineffective Assistance Waivers Violate Due Process 
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis creates dangerous implications for 
criminal defendants.  A criminal defendant is owed the right to effective 
assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of the criminal process.153  
Maintaining that a defendant has this unfettered right in pre-plea 
proceedings but not post-plea proceedings is an arbitrary distinction that 
violates due process. 
a.  Ineffective Assistance Waivers are Fundamentally Uninformed 
Ineffective assistance waivers violate a defendant’s due process rights 
because a defendant cannot knowingly waive his right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  In general, appeal waivers are considered “knowing” 
if the criminal defendant knows that he is waiving a right to appeal.154  The 
federal courts maintain that the defendant does not necessarily have to 
know what claims he is waiving the right to appeal.155  The Ninth Circuit 
summarized this distinction, saying, “Whatever appellate issues might have 
been available to [defendant] were speculative compared to the certainty 
derived from the negotiated plea with a set sentence parameter.  He knew 
he was giving up possible appeals, even if he did not know exactly what the 
nature of those appeals might be.”156   
Ineffective assistance waivers are fundamentally different from direct 
appeal waivers and should not be deemed “knowing” in the same sense as 
direct appeal waivers.  Section 2255 waivers often contain broad language 
and do not explicitly state that the defendant is giving up his right to 
effective assistance of counsel.157  If a defendant agrees in a plea colloquy 
                                                                                                     
 152. Id. at 1187. 
 153. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). 
 154. Reimelt, supra note 63, at 880. 
 155. See id. (“The U.S. Supreme Court holds that defendants may knowingly and 
voluntarily waive even uncertain rights.”). 
 156. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 913 F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 157. See Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
when asked, Nunez stated that he understood that the waiver covered every issue other than 
the voluntariness of the plea). 
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not to bring “any motions pursuant to a § 2255 appeal,” the defendant does 
not necessarily know that his Sixth Amendment right is implicated.  For 
example, in Nunez v. United States,158 the Seventh Circuit found that 
defendant Nunez waived his right to bring an ineffective assistance claim 
because his plea agreement contained a broad collateral attack waiver.159  
The Supreme Court remanded the case based on Seventh Circuit’s broad 
interpretation of the waiver and asked if the § 2255 waiver necessarily 
comprehended an ineffective assistance waiver.160  On remand, the Seventh 
Circuit maintained that the broad collateral waiver encompassed an 
ineffective assistance waiver.161  As a consequence, the Seventh Circuit 
dismissed Nunez’s claim that his attorney’s failure to file his requested 
appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.162 
Further, a criminal defendant assumes that the plea process will 
proceed within constitutional limitations.163  The Fourth Circuit summarizes 
this point, maintaining,  
Nor do we think such a defendant can fairly be said to have waived his 
right to appeal his sentence on the ground that the proceedings following 
entry of the guilty plea were conducted in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel, for a defendant's agreement to waive 
appellate review of his sentence is implicitly conditioned on the 
assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be 
conducted in accordance with constitutional limitations.164 
Therefore, a criminal defendant cannot knowingly waive his right to 
effective assistance of counsel because: (1) Section 2255 waivers are often 
written in broad and ambiguous language that do not mention effective 
assistance of counsel; and (2) A criminal defendant will assume the plea 
proceedings will proceed within constitutional limitations. 
                                                                                                     
 158. Nunez v. United States, 495 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, 544 U.S. 911 
(2008). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, n.15 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 161. See Nunez, 546 F.3d at 453 (“Because the plea was voluntary, the waiver of appeal 
must be in force.  And that waiver knocks out Nunez’s argument that his lawyer failed to 
follow his direction to file an appeal.”). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that waiver-
of-appeal provision in the plea agreement does not bar an appeal). 
 164. Id. 
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b.  Ineffective Assistance Waivers are Involuntary 
Ineffective assistance waivers also violate due process because a 
criminal defendant cannot voluntarily relinquish his right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  The majority of circuits maintain a rather narrow 
interpretation of voluntary, holding that it means that the defendant cannot 
be coerced into agreeing to an appellate waiver provision.165  The defendant 
must not have been under threat or coercion, the defendant must not have 
been fed false promises, and the defendant must be mentally competent and 
not under the influence of drugs to the extent his judgment was impaired.166 
However, ineffective assistance waivers implicate constitutional 
considerations and demand a different analysis.  The example of Michael 
Powell provides an illustration of the unacceptable unfairness of the 
waivers.167  In 1999, Powell, an indigent defendant in extremely poor 
health, pled guilty to selling drugs and waived the right to directly appeal or 
collaterally attack his sentence.168  Powell was diagnosed with kidney 
disease at the age of 18, underwent dialysis three times a week, and needed 
a kidney transplant.169  Such a severe medical condition qualified Powell for 
a downward departure of his sentence.170  However, Powell’s defense 
counsel failed to move for a downward departure that is explicitly reserved 
for this type of situation.171  If Powell’s attorney had competently argued 
for the downward departure, Powell could have received the mandatory 
minimum of six months.172  Instead, Powell was sentenced to 136 months 
imprisonment.173  Thus, defense counsel’s lack of adequate representation 
at sentencing resulted in Powell serving six years longer than he would 
have under the downward departure.174  Moreover, Powell was powerless to 
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challenge his attorney’s ineffective assistance because he signed a collateral 
waiver.175 
Michael Powell’s guilty plea did not strip him of his right to competent 
counsel.  Rather, much of defense counsel’s most important work for his 
client occurs at the sentencing hearing.  In a system where barely 3 percent 
of defendants plead “not guilty,” the guilt/innocence phase of the plea 
bargain process is often trivial.176  What really matters to the client is not 
the entrance of guilty or not guilty, but how much time he will have to 
serve.  As the American Bar Association concludes: 
It is unfortunately too often the case that the defense attorney considers 
his job completed once he has assisted the defendant through the guilt 
phase of the proceedings and perhaps jock-eyed for the most lenient 
sentencing judge…. Many lawyers view their functions at sentencing to 
involve superficial incantations of mercy; others merely to seek the 
lightest possible sentence without much concern for the real needs of the 
defendant. . . . [However], for many convicted defendants the sentence 
will be the most important and the only really difficult issue in the 
case.177 
It is not in the defendant’s self-interest to give a free pass to his 
attorney to render ineffective assistance of counsel at his sentencing 
hearing.  Accordingly, such a waiver is inherently involuntary, and 
inclusion of the waiver violates a defendant’s due process rights.  
Therefore, ineffective assistance waivers are invalid because such 
provisions violate a defendant’s due process rights and contravene legal 
ethics. 
IV.  Attorney’s Failure to File Appeal Constitutes Ineffective Assistance 
The right to effective assistance of counsel is not a waivable right, and 
this right encompasses an attorney filing a requested appeal in a post-
waiver case.  Three reasons compel this conclusion.  First, as already 
described, the Supreme Court case of Roe v. Flores-Ortega178 requires an 
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attorney to file for an appeal upon the express instruction to do so.179  
Second, the attorney’s role as advocate necessitates that he safeguards the 
rights of his client.180  Third, the attorney’s role as officer of the court 
appeals means that he helps protect the integrity of the criminal justice 
system.181 
A.  Attorney’s Role as Client’s Advocate 
An attorney’s role as advocate compels that he files an appeal in a 
post-waiver situation.  As an advocate, attorneys are endowed with the 
responsibility of zealously protecting the rights of their client, and the right 
to appeal is one such right.182  It is true that a criminal defendant who has 
signed an appeal waiver faces a small chance of appellate success.183  
However, attorneys who do not file a requested appeal foreclose the 
possibility of vindicating any wrongs done to their client.184  Further, courts 
have not only carved out exceptions to enforcing appeal waivers, but the 
jurisprudential landscape is also continuing to evolve.185  Consequently, 
                                                                                                     
466 U.S. 668 (1984), provides the proper framework for evaluating a claim that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See MODEL RULES, supra note 162, at pmbl. (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.”) 
 181. See id. at R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (“This rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as 
officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the interest of the adjudicatory 
process.”). 
 182. See MODEL RULES, supra note 126. 
 183. See Reimelt, supra note 63, at 879 (noting that the majority of courts uphold the 
validity of appeal waivers). 
 184. See Campusano v. United States, 442 F.3d 770, 772–73 (“Although applying the 
Flores-Ortega presumption to waiver cases would bestow on most defendants nothing more 
than the opportunity to lose the second circuit would not cut corners where Sixth 
Amendment rights are at stake.”); see also Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 358 
(6th Cir. 2012):  
We made clear that the failure to perfect a direct appeal, in derogation of a defendant’s 
actual request, is a per se violation of the sixth amendment.  Consistent with Flores-
Ortega, we also indicated that such a violation occurs without regard to the probability 
of success on appeal because such a failure on the attorney’s part deprives the defendant 
of any counsel whatsoever, for purpose of the Strickland analysis, prejudice must be 
presumed. 
See also Campbell 686 F.3d at 358 (“Even where an appeal appears frivolous, an attorney’s 
obligations to his or her client do not end at the moment the guilty plea is entered.”). 
 185. See infra Part IV(A)(2). 
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attorneys would be remiss to fail to file a notice of appeal because they 
could be surrendering a client’s meritorious claim. 
1.  Exceptions to Enforcement of Appellate Waivers 
Appellate waivers are not enforced in certain circumstances.186  Such 
circumstances include: the sentence imposed is in excess of the statutory 
maximum,187 the plea proceedings violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel,188 the waiver was involuntary,189 the sentence was 
influenced by a constitutionally impermissible factor like race190 or 
naturalized status,191 or the sentence imposed diverges from the sentence 
agreed to in the plea agreement.192  Ineffective assistance of counsel 
waivers, as previously discussed, will also not be enforced if the ineffective 
assistance pertained to the plea negotiations.193 
In addition to these outlined exceptions, the Second, Fourth, and 
Seventh Circuits have also added a catch-all qualifier, the so-called “whim 
qualifier.”  The Fourth Circuit explained, “[a] defendant who waives his 
right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the 
whim of the district court.”194  Further, the First Circuit, Third Circuit, and 
Tenth Circuit also prescribe to the idea that an appellate waiver will not be 
enforced if doing so would result in a “miscarriage of justice.”195  The 
Tenth Circuit attempted to explain this vague phrase, noting that it includes 
situations: “(1) where the district court relied on an impermissible factor 
such as race, (2) where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 
the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, (3) where the 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) where the waiver is 
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otherwise unlawful.”196  However, the fourth prong itself of “otherwise 
unlawful” is vague.  A competent advocate could very well argue that his 
client’s waiver constitutes a miscarriage of justice, or that a sentence was so 
outrageous that it should fall under the “whim” exception. 
2.  Evolution of “Knowing and Voluntary” Conceptions 
Importantly, several judges have “broken ranks” from the normal 
conception of the “knowing and voluntary” test, and argued that giving up 
one’s right to appeal can never be knowing and voluntary.197  For example, 
in United States v. Raynor, District Judge Friedman articulated that: 
[A] defendant can never knowingly and intelligently waive the right to 
appeal or collaterally attack a sentence that has not yet been imposed. 
Such a waiver is by definition uninformed and unintelligent and cannot 
be voluntary and knowing.  Until the sentence is imposed, the defendant 
cannot possibly know what it is he or she is waiving.  A plea that 
requires such a waiver of unknown rights cannot comport with Rule 11 
or the Constitution.198 
The court went on to explain the uninformed nature of appellate 
waivers: 
[W]hen a defendant gives up the right to a trial in favor of a plea, he or 
she knows that there will no longer be twelve jurors sitting in judgment, 
that there will no longer be live testimony and the right to confront 
witnesses, and that there will be no speedy and public trial . . . .  When a 
defendant waives the right to appeal a sentence, however, he or she is 
freed of none of the uncertainties that surround the sentencing process in 
exchange for giving up the right to later challenge a possibly erroneous 
application or interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines or a 
sentencing statute. [Such errors could include the court] mak[ing] 
incorrect, unsupportable factual findings with respect to the amount of 
drugs involved, the nature of the relevant conduct to be considered or 
                                                                                                     
 196. United States v. Bell, 437 Fed. Appx. 658, 663 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 197. Campbell & Castanias, supra note 48, at 34 (“Three recent district court 
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whether . . . [the] defendant[] was involved in more than minimal 
planning with respect to the narcotics conspiracy to which they pled. 199   
In United States v. Melancon, District Judge Parker made a persuasive 
case for an appellate waiver never being knowing, saying, “What is really 
being waived is not some abstract right to appeal, but the right to correct an 
erroneous application of the Guidelines or an otherwise illegal sentence.” 200 
Judge Parker continued, “This right cannot come into existence until after 
the judge pronounces sentence; it is only then that the defendant knows 
what errors the district court has made . . . .”201 
Recent Supreme Court decisions give further weight to the criticism of 
the knowing and voluntary test.  In United States v. Booker,202 the Court 
held that the Sentencing Guidelines were not mandatory, but 
discretionary.203  Now a defendant signing a sentencing-appeal waiver does 
not even know that the judge must sentence him within certain defined 
parameters.  Furthermore, the cases of Frye and Cooper demonstrate that 
the Court is concerned that plea bargain defendants receive a fair 
sentence.204  In light of Frye and Cooper, at least one district court judge 
has rejected a plea bargain because it contained an appellate waiver.205 
As more criticism is launched at courts and as more judges break 
ranks, the “knowing and voluntary” test evolves.  This evolution paves the 
way for dedicated attorneys to create pathways to the non-enforcement of 
appellate waivers.  Defense counsel owes a duty to their clients to file 
requested appeals on the chance that the appeal is meritorious. 
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 201. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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B.  Attorney’s Role as Officer of the Court 
In addition to being advocates, attorneys are officers of the court.206  
As officers of the court, attorneys must work within their proper role as 
defense counsel and not usurp the role of the judge.  Further, attorneys must 
help promote the integrity of the justice system by working to ensure 
criminal defendants receive fair and just sentences. 
1.  Proper Division of Power in the Courtroom 
The judicial system relies on a proper division of power between 
prosecutor, defense attorney, and judge.  Appellate court judges exercise 
the unique right to decide whether or not an appeal has merit.207  An 
attorney does not have the right to determine if an appeal should be granted.  
Accordingly, even when an attorney believes his client’s appeal would be 
frivolous, he may not ignore the client’s direction.208  Rather, the attorney 
must file an Anders brief with both the court and the client, requesting to 
withdraw but referring to “anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal.”209 
In United States v. Gomez-Perez,210 the Second Circuit extended the 
Anders brief logic to the post-waiver situation.211  In Gomez-Perez, the 
defendant filed a pro se appeal despite the presence of an appellate 
                                                                                                     
 206. Powell v. Alabama, 53 S. Ct. 55, 73 (1932); see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 
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waiver.212  The Second Circuit determined that the Anders brief is still 
required in the post-waiver situation.213  Further, the Anders brief in a post-
waiver situation must specifically address: “(1) whether the plea and waiver 
were knowing, voluntary, and competent; (2) whether it would be against 
the defendant’s interest to contest his or her plea; and (3) any issues 
implicating rights that cannot be, or arguably were not, waived.”214  By 
insisting on an Anders brief even in a post-waiver situation, Gomez-Perez 
affirms that the appellate court is the ultimate decider of the merits of a 
criminal defendant’s claim. 
The Second Circuit extended the Gomez reasoning in the Campusano 
case.215  If the attorney is asked to file an appeal that the attorney believes to 
be frivolous due to an appellate waiver, the attorney must nevertheless file 
the appeal in conjunction with an Anders brief.216  The attorney’s role is that 
of the advocate, and the judge’s role is that of deciding the merits of the 
case.  A proper respect for the division of power in the courtroom demands 
that an attorney file a notice of appeal in a post-waiver situation.217 
2.  Promoting Sentencing Uniformity in the Criminal Justice System 
Attorneys are also obligated to file appeals because appeals are 
essential in ensuring uniformity and justness in sentencing.218  In 1984, 
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act,219 which established the 
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United States Sentencing Commission and set out as its goal to create a 
uniform system of sentencing in this country.220  The fact that the 
Sentencing Guidelines are now advisory and not mandatory does not 
change the underlying goal that criminal defendants receive fair and just 
sentences.221 
Plea-bargaining can frustrate sentencing justness and uniformity 
because prosecutors wield wide discretionary power in determining what 
charges to bring and thereby what sentencing levels will be on the table.  
Unfairness in sentencing can create disastrous consequences, like 
incentivizing a risk-averse innocent defendant to plead guilty.222  A criminal 
defendant may feel compelled to take a plea deal because post-trial 
sentences, though rarely imposed, are very harsh.223 
                                                                                                     
Crime Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of guidelines 
that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment: deterrence, 
incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.  The Act delegates 
broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal 
sentencing process. 
 220. See id. §1A1.3 (Nov. 2012). The Guidelines describe three significant sentencing 
reforms: 
The Act’s basic objective was to enhance the ability of the criminal 
justice system to combat crime through an effective, fair sentencing 
system.  To achieve this end, Congress first sought honesty in 
sentencing.  It sought to avoid the confusion and implicit deception that 
arose out of the pre-guidelines sentencing system which required the 
court to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and 
empowered the parole commission to determine how much of the 
sentence an offender actually would serve in prison.  This practice 
usually resulted in a substantial reduction in the effective length of the 
sentence imposed, with defendants often serving only about one-third of 
the sentence imposed by the court.  Second, Congress sought reasonable 
uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences 
imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar 
offenders.  Third, Congress sought proportionality in sentencing 
through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for 
criminal conduct of differing severity. 
 221. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 222. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[Plea 
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 223. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat 
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“The expected post-
trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of cases.  It is like the sticker price for cars: 
only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything less 
as a bargain.”). 
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The story of Erma Faye Stewart, a single mother of two in Hearne, 
Texas, presents a human face to this unsettling reality.224  Ms. Stewart was 
arrested as part of a large drug bust based upon an informant’s tip to the 
police.225  Ms. Stewart was booked in jail and given a public defender.226  
Maintaining her innocence, Ms. Stewart pleaded with her attorney to 
conduct investigative work to prove her innocence, but her attorney urged 
her to take the plea deal.227  Ms. Stewart did not have the money to post 
bond, and a jury trial would be scheduled months in advance.228  Worried 
about her children, Ms. Stewart pled guilty and was sentenced to ten years 
probation and a $1,000 fine.229  The other cases in the “drug bust” went to 
trial,230 where the informant was flatly disproven and the cases collapsed.231  
All cases were dismissed, except for those defendants who had already 
taken the plea deal.232  Unable to find work and saddled with a felony 
conviction, probation, court fines, and probation fines, Ms. Stewart lost her 
home, and consequently, lost her children to the foster care system.233  
Ms. Stewart’s case speaks to the grim reality that plea-bargaining 
involves a game of risks.  Defendants are incentivized to take plea deals, 
even if they maintain their innocence, because of financial desperation or 
fears of harsh sentences at trial.234  In fact, the Innocence Project estimates 
that 25% of all DNA exonerations involve crimes where the defendant pled 
guilty, made an incriminating statement, or delivered an outright 
confession.235 
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The only way to ensure that Congress’ goal of fairness in sentencing is 
achieved is through the appellate process.  As Judge Kane warned in his 
Vanderwerff decision, “Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers 
undermines the ability of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional 
validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in 
sentencing decisions.”236  Thus, the integrity of the judicial system hinges 
on appellate review; allowing attorneys to refuse to file appeals undermines 
goals of justice. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s recent extension of the right to 
effective assistance of counsel to the plea-bargaining process suggests a 
shift in the jurisprudential landscape.  Plea-bargaining merits closer 
scrutiny, and the appellate waiver is one such feature that demands 
examination.  While the appellate waiver has been approved both by the 
federal circuit courts and in practice, limitations should still be placed on 
the waiver to ensure defendants are afforded constitutional protections.  In 
particular, appellate waivers should not alter pre-existing obligations 
between defense attorneys and their clients, like the obligation to file a 
requested appeal.  The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit 
split and find that an attorney renders ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to file a requested appeal in a post-waiver situation. 
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